





VVITHIN the Federal Reserve System, the body
that determines the nation’s monetary policy is the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The FOMC
meets several times each year, specifying targets for
the federal funds rate and money growth over the
period until the next scheduled meeting.’ Twice each
year, in February and July, the FOMC also announces
its annual objectives forgrowth ofthe monetary aggre-
gates. The Committee began setting targets for the
growth rates of the monetary aggregates in 1970, be-
cause ofagrowing recognition ofthe effects of money
growth on total spending and inflation. The FOMC
also gives some weight to the short-run stability of
interest rates, expressed as ranges for the federal
funds rate.
After the FOMC determines the objectives formone-
tary polity, the task of implementing the policy is
delegated to the staff of the Open Market Desk at the
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‘The FOMC consists ofthe seven membersof the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors andfive ofthe 12 Federal ReserveBank presi-
dents, The Chairman of the Board of Governors is, by tradition,
chairman of theFOMC. The presidentof the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York is a permanent member of the FOMC and, also by
tradition, its vice chairman. The four remaining memberships rotate
among the presidents and are held for one-year terms beginning
March 1 of each year. All Federal Reserve Bankpresidents attend
the meetings and presenttheirviews, but only thosewho are mem-
bers ofthe FOMC cast votes. The FOMCcurrently haseight sched-
uled meetingseach year,but mayhavea conference-call meeting to
reevaluate monetarypolicy atany time.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Open Market
Desk does this by buying and selling federal govern-
ment securities for the Federal Reserve System. It
increases reserves of the banking system by buying
additional government securities and decreases re-
serves by selling securities.
The FOMC’s instructions to the Open Market Desk
also include a procedure that it should use to imple-
ment monetary policy. This paper identifies three dis-
tinct procedures used by the Open Market Desk since
1970. The purpose of the paper is to describe the
mechanics of these three operating procedures, iden-
tifying the steps followed by the Open Market Desk in
determining theamount ofreserves to supply through
open market operations.
The first procedure, which was used in the 1970s,
involved targeting on the federal funds rate; the Open
Market Deskwould supply the level ofreserves neces-
sary to keep the federal funds rate within ranges spe-
cifiedby the FOMC for periods between meetings. The
next procedure, used during the three years ending in
October 1982, involved targeting on levels of nonbor-
rowed reserves (reserves other than those borrowed
from Federal Reserve Banks); these were based on the
FOMC objectives for the money stock. This procedure
allowed for wider short-run fluctuations in the federal
funds rate. Under the final procedure, in effect since
October1982, the objective ofthe Open Market Desk in
each reserve maintenance period is to keep the total of
reserves borrowed by depository institutions from
Federal Reserve Banks near some desired level. The
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desired level ofborrowings reflects the desired degree
of reserve restraint specified by the FOMC at each
meeting.
BASIC TOOL FOR EXPOSITION:
SCPPLY AND DEMAND
FOR RESERVES
The mechanics of the implementation of monetary
policy under the three operating procedures can be
described by analyzing themarket for total reserves of
depository institutions. These reserves include cur-
rency that depository institutions hold in their vaults
and reserve balances they hold at Federal Reserve
Banks. Depository institutions hold reserves to facili-
tate their customers’ transactions and to meet reserve
requirements imposed by the Federal Reserve. The
required reserves are based on the amount and com-
position of their deposit liabilities.
Because they earn no interest on reserves, there is
an opportunity cost fordepository institutions to hold
them. The opportunity cost is identified in this paper
as thefederal funds rate, the interest rate that deposi-
tory institutions charge each other for lending re-
serves.2 If a depository institution must increase its
reserves, it borrows at the federal funds rate; ifit can
reduce its reserves, it lends at the federal funds rate.
In the three figures used in this paper, the demand
for reserves by depository institutions is drawn as a
function of the federal funds rate. Reserve require-
ments on those deposits included in the money stock
create a close relationship between the demand for
money by the public and the demand for reserves by
depository institutions. The demand for money is as-
sumed to be a function of total spending in the econ-
omy and interest rates. Various influences can cause
shifts in the demand curve for reserves. A change in
total spending in the economy, which influences the
demand for money, would cause the demand curve
for reserves to shift. Shifts in the demand for reserves
could also reflect changes in the random component
of money demand, a change in the average reserve
requirement on deposit liabilities included in the
‘Federal funds brokers facilitate the operation of the federal funds
market. These brokers receive orders from depository institutions
located throughout the nation to lend or borrow reserves, and the
brokersmatch lenders andborrowersat mutually agreeableinterest
rates. Most of the transactions through the federal funds market
involve borrowingand lending reserves forone day. The transfers of
reserves to borrowers aremade the sameday through wiretransfer
systems,including the Fed Wire of the Federal ReserveSystem.
money stock or a change in the demand for exces~
reserves.
Thefactors that influence the supply ofreserves car
be analyzed by considering separately the determi~
nants of borrowed and nonborrowed reserves. Non-
borrowed reserves (NBR) are detennined by the open
market operations of the Open Market Desk.
The amount of reserves borrowed from Federal Re-
serve Banks is influenced by the spread between the
federal funds rate and the discount rate, and by the
conditions set by the Federal Reserve for permitting
depository institutions to borrow reserves. Ifthe dis-
count rate is above the federal funds rate, the amount
of reserves borrowed from Federal Reserve Banks
tends to be relatively low and insensitive to small
changes in thefederal funds rate. The supply curvefor
reserves reflects this observation. The supply curve is
drawn as averticalline from the levelofNBR(labeled N
in the figures) up to the level on the vertical axis at
which the federal funds rate equals the discount rate,
indicated as r~ = rd.
The shape ofthe supply curve in the range in which
the federal funds rate exceeds the discount rate de-
pends on the conditions under which Federal Reserve
Banks permit depository institutions to borrow re-
serves. If the Federal Reserve did not set limits on
borrowings, no institution would pay more than the
discount rate to borrow reserves in the federal funds
market. In that case, the relevant supply curve in the
range ofthe horizontal axis above NBR would behori-
zontal atthe levelof the federal funds rate equal to the
discount rate.
The relevant supply curve is not horizontal, how-
ever; instead, it slopes upward, like the curves in the
three figures labelled 5,, S. and 5,. The shape of each
supply curve reflects a method of nonprice rationing
of borrowed reserves among depository institutions.
These supply curves differ only by theamount of NBR;
each curve reflects the same method of nonprice ra-
tioning ofborrowed reserves.
The Federal Reserve rations borrowed reserves by
setting limits on the borrowings by each depository
institution. These limits are set in terms of (1) the
amounts borrowed relative to the required reserves of
the depository institution and (2) the frequency and
duration ofits borrowings. Depository institutions try
to avoid exceeding these borrowing limits to ensure
that they will have access to credit to covershort-term
liquidity requirements. Ifa depository institution bor-
rows now, it will besubjected to greater administrative
pressure to limit its borrowings in the future) when
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the attractiveness ofborrowing from thediscount win-
dow might be greater. Consequently, it takes an in-
crease in the spread between the federal funds rate
and the discount rate to induce depository institu-
tions to increase their borrowings from the discount
window. The slope of each supply curve reflects this
relationship between borrowings and theinterest rate
spread.
The three figures in this paper illustrate short-run
relationships between the supply and demand for re-
serves. In figure 1, the relevant time period is a one-
week reserve maintenance period.’ ‘t’he relevant time
period forfigure 2i safew weeks between FOMC meet-
ings. Forfigure 3, which illustrates the current operat-
ing procedure, the time period is a two-week reserve
maintenance period. Reserve maintenance periods
were lengthened from one week to two weeks in Feb-
wary 1984, when the Federal Reserve adopted con-
temporaneous reserve requirements.
Given its short-run focus, this paper does not
present a complete analysis ofthe money supply pro-
cess under each operating procedure. The more lim-
ited purpose of this paper is to describe how open
market operations are determined under each operat-
ing procedure for a given short time period. The fol-
lowing sections indicate how the short-mn analysis of
each operating procedure would fit into amore com-
plete analysis of the money supply process.
TARG1E~’TINGON TilE FEDERAL
FUNDS RATE: 1970 THROUGH
SEPTEMBER 1979
The Federal Reserve attempted to control the
money stock during the 1970sby confining the federal
funds rate to relatively narrow ranges, specified at
each FOMC meeting. The use of this procedure was
based on the assumption of astable demand function
for money. (Asindicated previously, money demand is
assumed to be a function of interest rates and total
spending in the economy. For the period of a few
weeks between FOMC meetings, total spending is as-
sumed to be independent of current policy actions.(
The Federal Reserve attempted to control the money
stock through its influence on interest rates by moving
the public up or down its demand for money
schedule.
‘A reserve maintenance period is aperiod over which daily average
reserves must equal or exceed daily average required reserves to
avoida penalty forreserve deficiency.
The Statem.entof P0MG Objectives
At each meeting, the FOMC stated its growth objec-
tives for the monetary aggregates as ranges from the
average ofthemonth before themeeting to the average
of the month of the next scheduled meeting. For in-
stance, on September 18, 1979, the last meeting under
this operating procedure, the FOMC’sobjective for Ml
was an annual growth rate between 3 percent and 8
percent from August through October.
At each meeting, the FOMC directed the Open Mar-
ket Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to
keep the federal funds rate within a range of about 50
to 100 basis points until the next meeting, and often
specified an initial level for the federal funds rate
within the target range. The manager of the Open
Market Desk was authorized to let the federal funds
rate move toward the top or bottom of the specified
range ifthe money stock was tending to rise above or
fall below that desired by the FOMC. The Open Market
Desk supplied the amounts of NBR necessary to keep
the federal funds rate within the target range. Occa-
sionally, the FOMC changed the range for the federal
funds rate in conference calls held between sched-
uled meetings if the money stockwas tending to devi-
ate substantially from its objective.’
The implementation of.F0MG Directives
The conduct of monetary policy under this proce-
dure is illustrated in figure 1. At one of its scheduled
meetings, the FOMC would specify an initial level for
the federal funds rate for the period immediately after
the meeting (r~) and a range for the rate until the next
scheduled meeting (r,, — rh The Open Market Desk
then would adjust NBR to keep the federal funds rate
at the initial target rate immediately afterthe meeting
and within thetarget range until the next meeting.’
The time period for the supply and demand curves
in figure 1 is one reserve maintenance week. Lagged
4The description of the procedure of targeting on the federal funds
rate is based on Lombra and Torto (1975), Holmes and Sternlight
(1977), Wallichand Keir (1979) and Lindsey(1984).
‘In examining monetary policy actions, this paper focuses exclu-
sively on the level of NBR. Changes in NBR through open market
operations are the most frequent policy actions by the Federal
Reserve. By focusing on the supply of NBR, the paper abstracts
fromthe effectsofotherpolicyactionson the supply anddemandfor
reserves. An increase (decrease) in thediscount rate would cause
the upward-sloping part ofthe supply curve to rise (fall).Changes in
theconditions forborrowing reserves would changetheslope ofthe
supply curve in the range in which thefederalfunds rate exceedsthe
discount rate. Finally, a change in the reserve requirement ratios
wouldcause the demand curve to shift.
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Targeting on the Federal Funds Rate
Federal
feed, Rate
reserve requirements were in effect during the period
inwhich the Open Market Desk targeted on thefederal
funds rate. Under lagged reserve requirements, re-
quired reserves in each maintenance week were pre-
determined, since they were based on deposits two
weeks earlier. Consequently, the demand curves in
figure 1 are drawn relatively steep.’ With required re-
serves predetermined for each period, the slope ofthe
demand curves reflects the responsiveness of the de-
mand forexcess reserves to changes in thelevels ofthe
federal funds rate.
The demand for reserves in the first week after the
FOMC meeting is denoted by the curve D,. The Open
Market Desk would supply NBR equal to N, to keep the
eUnderlagged reserve requirements,each maintenance period cov-
ered seven days ending each Wednesday. Required reserves for
each maintenance period were based on deposit liabilities in the
maintenanceperiodtwoweeksearlier. Underthecontemporaneous
reserve requirements currently in effect, each maintenance period
covers 14 days ending every other Wednesday. The required re-
serves of each depository institution on its checkable deposits are
based on its average checkable deposits over a 14-day period
ending two days before the end of the current maintenance period.
See Gilbert and Trebing (1982) for a description of lagged and
contemporaneous reserve requirements.
federal funds i-ate at r~.Suppose there was a large
increase in the demand for reserves in the second
week, represented by the shift in the demand curve
from D, to D,.This increase in thedemand for reserves
would reflect an increase in thedemand for money. To
accommodate the increase in the demand for re-
serves, the Open Market Desk would increase NBR in
order to keep the federal funds rate in the target range
set by the FOMC. In figure 1,the Desk would increase
the supply of NBRto N, to keep the federal funds rate
at rt.
If, however, the money stock was tending to rise
above the desired range of the FOMC, the Desk might
have increased NBR to only N,, thus allowing the fed-
eral funds rate to rise to the top of the range fr,). Any
authorization for the Open Market Desk to allow an
additional rise in the federal funds rate before the next
scheduled FOMC meeting would require an FOMC
conference call to specify a new range for the federal
funds rate.
Discussions ofthe advantages ofthis operating pro-
cedure usually emphasize how the Federal Reserve
could prevent transitory fluctuations in the federal
funds rate, while controlling the growth rate of the
money supply over a quarter ofayear or longer, peri-
ods that are relevant for stabilizing economic activity.
One cause of transitory fluctuations in the federal
funds rate was Open Market Desk errors in measuring
NBR in the current week. The Federal Reserve had to
estimate several factors that influence NBR, such as
balances of the U.S. Treasury atFederal Reserve Banks
and Federal Reserve float. If, however, the Federal Re~
serve made large errors in estimating the current level
of NBR, this procedure would offsetthose errors auto-
matically. Forinstance, ifactual NBR fellbelowFederal
Reserve estimates, the federal funds rate would tend
to rise abovethe target rate, and theOpen Market Desk
would respond by buying additional securities, thus
increasing NBR.
Another type of transitory effect on interest rates
would be a transitory shift in the demand for total
reserves. The demand for total reserves may shift for
various reasons. There may be random fluctuations in
the demand for money, average reserve requirements
or excess reserves. Under this procedure, the Open
MarketDesk would offsetthe effects of such transitory
shifts in the demand for reserves by adjusting the level
of NBR to keep the federal funds rate unchanged.
The effects of transitory shifts in the demand for
total reserves are illustrated in figure 1. The demand
for reserves is illustrated by the curve D, in the first
‘I’
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week after an FOMC meeting, D, in the second week,
and D, again in the third week. If the Open Market
Desk kept NBR at N, throughout the three-week pe-
riod, the federal funds rate would be rt in week 1, P~
in week 2, and would fall back to r~ again in week 3.
The Open Market Deskwould avoid these fluctuations
in the federal funds rate by accommodating the ran-
dom fluctuations in demand for reserves. Following
this policy of accommodation, NBRwould be N, in the
first week, N, in the second week, and N, again in the
third week.
‘iNc Role n/’the Operaflog Procethire in
the Money Supply .Process
The position of the supply curve for reserves in a
given maintenance week had little effect on the quan-
tity of reserves supplied, because required reserves in
each week were based on the deposits of two weeks
earlier. The position ofthe supply curve did influence
the level of the federal funds rate. In attempting to
control the money supply, the Federal Reserve relied
on the influence that changes in the federal funds rate
would have on other interest ratesand the influence of
interest rates on the quantity of money demanded in
the future. Money demand was assumed to be in-
fluenced by lagged values of interest rates. A more
thorough treatment of the money supply process un-
der this operating procedure would require an analy-
sis of the effects of policy actions over several reserve
maintenance periods. The multiperiod analysis would
include changes in the FOMC’s federal funds rate ob-
jectives in response to deviations of the money stock
from desired levels and the lagged effects of changes
in interest rates on money demand.
The major problem with this procedure was that, in
attempting to stabilize the federal funds rate, the Fed-
eral Reserve could miss its targets for the money stock
for periods long enough to affect total spending in the
economy. A shift in the demand for reserves may have
indicated that the federal funds rate must be allowed
to change if the Open Market Desk is to supply the
level of reserves that is consistent with FOMC objec-
tives for the monetary aggregates. An increase in the
demand for reserves may have reflected a rise in the
rate of total spending in the economy, which would
cause the demand for money to rise. By targeting on a
fixed level of the federal funds rate in such circum-
stances, the Federal Reserve may conduct aprocycli-
cal monetary policy — increasing decreasing) the
level of total reserves in response to a rise fall) in the




On October 6, 1979, the FOMC abandoned the pro-
cedure oftargeting on the federal funds rate in favorof
an NBR operating procedure. Most of theFOMC mem-
bers concluded that the degree of monetary control
under the previous procedure had become unsatisfac-
tory. They decided to adopt, instead, a procedure in
which the objective of open market operations was to
supply the amount of reserves consistent with their
objectives for money growth, while permitting larger
fluctuations in the federal funds rate.7
The Statement of.FOMC Obiectives
One of thechanges adopted at the meeting on Octo-
ber 6, 1979, involved the way the FOMC stated its
objectives for the growth of the tnonetary aggregates
for periods between scheduled meetings. The FOMC
began stating its objectives as a specific percentage
growth rate foreach monetary aggregate from amonth
before the meeting to some future month. For in-
stance, the objective for Ml adopted on October 6,
1979, was an annual growth rate of 4.50 percent from
September to December 1979.
Although the FOMC continued to specify ranges for
the federal funds rate, those ranges were widened
significantly. Formost periods, the range was400 basis
points, compared with ranges of 50 to 100basis points
under theprocedure oftargeting on the federal funds
rate. These wide ranges on the federal funds rate
played a minor role in the implementation of mone-
tary policy under the new NBR operating procedure.
In fact, on several occasions the FOMC widened its
ranges between scheduled meetings when the rate
threatened to move outside the previously established
limits. On other occasions, the federal funds rate was
allowed to move outside its range for short periods of
time.’
The .hnpicmentation of.PIMIG ..iJirectives
After each FOMC meeting, the Federal Reserve staff
estimated theaverage level of total reserves that would
be necessary to support the money stock desired by
the FOMC. That average level was called the total re-
‘Federal ReserveBulletin (December 1979), p.974.
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serve path. Estimates of the total reserves path were
based on (1) FOMC objectives for Ml and M2 and (2)
estimates ofthe average reserve requirements on de-
posit liabilities in Ml and M2, currency, required re-
serves on liabilities of depository institutions not in-
cluded in Ml or M2, and excess reserves. The staff
generally re-estimated the total reserves path each
week.
At each meeting, the FOMC made an assumption
about the average level of borrowed reserves over the
period until the next scheduled meeting. The FOMC’s
borrowings assumption was often near the avei’age
level ofborrowings just before the meetings. The staff
determined the level of NBR on which the Open Mar-
ket Desk targeted open market operations (called the
NBR path) by subtracting the FOMCs borrowings as-
sumption from the total reserves path.
The implementation of monetary policy under this
operating procedure is illustrated in figure 2. In con-
trast to the procedure illustrated in figure 1, the Open
Market Desk would not increase the level of NBR in
response to an increase in the demand for reserves; it
might actually decrease NBR to keep total reserves
near its path level.’
Levels of total reserves and NBR on the horizontal
axis refer to average levels for the weeks between
FOMC meetings. The total reserves path is illustrated
as R’. The NBR path is N,, since the FOMC set the
borrowings assumption at R’ minus N,.
The demand curves for reserves represent the rela-
tionship between the federal funds rate and the aver-
age quantity of reserves demanded over a few weeks
between FOMC meetings. Since the time period is a
few weeks, required reserves are not predetermined
but may be influenced by policy actions ofthe current
period. A rise in the federal funds rate, for instance,
might cause the quantity of money demanded to de-
cline and, therefore, cause required reserves to de-
cline. For these reasons, the demand curves have a
flatter slope in figure 2 than in figure 1.
Total reserves would be at the path level R if the
demand curve for reserves was D,. From that initial
position, consider the effects of an increase in the
demand for reserves, illustrated by a shift in the de-
mand curve to D,, which resulted from an increase in
the demand for money. Total reserves would rise to R,,
‘Lindsey (1982, 1983, 1984) describeshow the procedure of target-
ing on NBR worked in practice by examining the timing of money
growthrelative to FOMC objectives, borrowed reserves, the federal
funds rateand the discount rate.
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above the total reserves path, and the federal fund~
rate would rise from P to r. Without any additiona
policy actions, the money stock would exceed thr
FOMC’s objectives because total reserves would br
above the path level. Foragiven rise in the demand foi
reserves, however, the amount by which the mone~
stock would exceed the FOMC objective would b
smaller under this operating procedure than if th
Open Market Desk had supplied the reserves neces
sary to keep the federal funds i-ate unchanged at rt.
During some periods between FOMC meetings, th
Federal Reserve adjusted the level of the NBR path oi
the discount rate to reduce the deviations of th
money stockfrom desired levels.” The Federal Reserv
took those policy actions when the deviations ap
peaied to reflect more than a transitory movement is
the money demand schedule, perhaps due to
strengthening of aggregate spending.”
Adjustments to the NBR path or discount rate be
“TheFederal ReserveBank ofNew Yorkpresentsadetailed descrip
tion of openmarketoperations throughouteach calendar year in th~
spring orsummerissuesofits QuarterlyReview in the following year
Those reports indicateseveral occasions on which the NBA targe
or thediscount ratewere changedwhen the staffprojectedthattota
reserves woulddeviate substantially from the path levels.
“See Lindsey(1983), p.S.
II, RI, *‘ F, Reservee
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tween FOMC meetings were based on projections of
total reserves. After each FOMC meeting, the staffesti-
mated the actual level of total reserves over the weeks
until the next meeting, as well as the total reserves
path, which was based on FOMC objectives for money
growth. The estimates of total reserves were based on
projections of the actual (in contrast to the desired)
money stock, average reserve requirements and~cess
reserves, given the existing discount rate and NBR
path. A substantial deviation between the staff esti-
mate of actual total reserves and the total reserves
path indicated that additional adjustments to the dis-
count rate or NBR path would be necessary to keep
the money stock close to the FOMC objectives.
In the situation illustrated in figure 2, the staff pro-
jects total reserves to be R,, which is above the total
reserves path IR*). The policy action illustrated in
figure 2i s a reduction in the NBR path relative to the
total reserves path (an increase in the borrowings as-
sumption). Total reserves are constrained to be at the
path levelby reducing the NBR path to N,,causing the
federal funds rate to rise to r~.
The Roleof the Operating Procedure in
the Money Supply Process
By adopting the NBR targeting procedure, the
FOMC changed the basic relationship on which the
money supply process was based. The prior pioce-
dure of targeting on the federal funds rate relied on a
stable demand function for money. The second proce-
dure of targeting on NBR relied on a relationship be-
tween reserves and the money stock. Path levels for
total reserves and NBR were re-estimated weekly to
incorporate the most current information available on
the relationship between reserves and the money
stock.
TARGETOG ON BORROWED
RESERVES: OCTOBER 1882 TO
THE PRESENT”
The Statement ofP0MG Objectives
At ameeting in October1982, the FOMC temporarily
suspended its short-run objectives for Ml. The event
that precipitated the de-emphasis of Ml was the ma-
turing of a large volume of all-savers certificates in
October 1982, which might have had a temporary ef-
fecton money demand. Also, movements offunds into
l
2
This descriptionofthe procedureof targetingon borrowed reserves
is basedon Wallich (1984).
and out of Ml were about to be affected in uncertain
amounts by the scheduled introduction of a couple of
monthly money-market-type accounts at banks and
thrift institutions. The de-emphasis of Ml continued
after these events because of an observed change in
the relationship between the money stock and total
spending in the economy.”
Suspending short-run objectives for Ml made it
necessary to change the operating procedure for im-
plementing monetary policy. The procedure oftarget-
ing NBR as described previously gave considerable
weight to the FOMC’s objective for Ml, since a large
proportion ofrequired reserves are against thedeposit
liabilities in Ml. The total reserves path could not be
estimated on the basis oftheFOMC’s objectives for M2
and Ma without an assumption or target for Ml over
the intermeeting period. The FOMC has resumed the
practice of specifying short-run objectives for Ml but
has not directed the Open Market Desk to resume use
of the procedure of tar-geting NBR.
In place of the NBR procedure, the Federal Reserve
adopted a procedure for targeting on borrowed re-
serves. At each meeting, the FOMC states its objectives
for open market operations in terms of degrees of
reserve restraint. The directive from the FOMC to the
Open Market Desk calls for more restraint, less re-
straint, or for the degree of reserve restraint to be
unchanged. In some directives, the FOMC also states
conditions for changing the degree ofreserve restraint
inthe period before the next scheduled meeting, such
as deviation ofthe rate of money growth from desired
rates or developments in the economy.
The Open Market Desk interprets the objectives of
the FQMC for the degree of reserve restraint in terms
of the average level of seasonal plus adjustment bor-
rowings over the intermeeting period.’~More restraint
would imply a higher level of borrowings and less
“See Axilrod (1985), pp. 18—19.
“See Wallich (1984), p. 26. Adjustment borrowings are short-term
loans from Federal Reserve Banks to depositoryinstitutions to aid
them in adjusting their reserves to required levels. Most institutions
repay their adjustment borrowings within a few days. Seasonal
borrowingsare longer-term loansto depositoryinstitutions that have
relativelystrong seasonal pattemsin theirloan demand ordeposits.
Other borrowingsare called extended credit, which is made avail-
able to institutions experiencing such severe financial difficulties
that they haveahard time attracting fundsfrom othersources, The
target for borrowings under the current operating procedure is in
termsof thesum ofseasonal plus adjustmentborrowings. Extended
credit is considered a relativelyfixed supply ofreserves, which is not
as sensitive to the spread between the federal funds rate and the
discount rateas seasonaland adjustmentborrowingsare. Extended
credit is counted as part of nonborrowed reserves for purposes of
implementing monetary policy under the current operating
procedure.
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restraint alowerlevel ofborrowings. The Open Market
Desk changes its target level for borrowings between
some FOMC meetings when the conditions for chang-
ing the degree of reserve restraint specified in the
latest FOMC directive do occur.
The Implementation o/FOAIC Directives
The amount of NBR supplied by the Open Market
Desk under the current operating procedure depends
on the target level forborrowed reserves and estimates
of total reserves prepared by the Federal Reserve staff.
The level of NBR to be supplied is determined by
subtracting thetarget level for borrowed reserves from
the staff estimate oftotal reserves.
The process of estimating total reserves depends on
the system of reserve accounting in effect. Under
lagged reserve requirements, in effect through January
1984, required reserves for each maintenance period
were known by the beginning of the period. The esti-
mate of total reserves for each period was derived by
adding an estimate of excess reserves to the known
level of required reserves.
Under contemporaneous reserve requirements, the
reserve accounting system currently in effect, re-
quired reserves for each maintenance period are not
known until afterthe end of the period. The staffesti-
matesrequired reserves for each maintenance period
revising the estimate several times during most peri
ods. The target levelsfor NBR are adjusted by the sami
dollar amounts as the revisions to estimates of re
quired reserves.
The implementation of monetary policy under th~
current operating procedure is illustrated in figure 3
This figure indicates that, by targeting on a given leve
of borrowed reserves, the Open Market Desk tends t
eliminate any effect of shifts in the demand for re
serves on the federal funds rate over a given 1-eservi
maintenance period.
Levels of total reserves and NBR on the horizonta
axis offigure 3 refer to average levels over a two-wee]
reserve maintenance period. The curves that repre
sent the demand for reserves are drawn as vertica
lines in figure 3; they are drawn as sloping downwarc
to the right in figures 1 and 2. This change does no
imply that the demand for reserves is less interest
elastic under the procedure of targeting on borrowe
reserves. The vertical demand curves reflect the wa
the demand for reserves is characterized under thi
operating procedure, that is, as a fixed amount of re
serves foreach maintenance period.
Early in the maintenance period, the staffestimate
total reserves at the level R,. With the target level fo
borrowed reserves equal to fl minus N,, the Opei
Market Desk plans to supply NBR of N,, which woub
yield an average federal funds rate of r’,. Suppose tha
laterin the period, the staff raises the estimate oftota
reserves to R,. In response, the Open Market Des.
raises its objective for NBR to N,, to keep R, minus N
equal to the original target level of fl minus N,. Thi
response to a rise in the demand for reserves wouli
keep the federal funds rate unchanged at rt.
The increase in the estimate oftotal reserves from F
to R, may reflect a larger increase in the money stoc
than desired by the FOMC. Ifthe FOMC directive call
foran increase in the degree ofreserve restraint in th
event of this undesired rise in the money stock, th
Open Market Desk would increase its target level fo
borrowings. The implications of an increase in th
target for borrowed reserves can be illustrated by rd
erence to figure 3. In response to the increase in th
estimate of total reserves from 11, to R,, the Open Mar
ket Desk increases the supply of NBRabove N,, but nc
as much as N,. In that case, the federal funds rat
would rise above rt. This response to an undesiree
rise in the money stock is similar to the respons
under the procedure of targeting on the federal fund
rate when the Open Market Desk allowed the federa
funds rate to riseto the top of its range.
II, F, N, F
3
Reserves
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the MOnewSupply Process
The current operating procedure has been de-
scribed by one member of the FOMC as “an indirect
method of influencing thefunds rate and other short-
term rates which, in turn, affect the demand for
money.” Thus, like the procedure of targeting on the
federal funds rate, the current method of controlling
themoney stock depends upon the influence of policy
actions on interest rates and the assumption ofa sta-
ble relationship between interest rates and the quan-
tity of money demanded.
The similarity ofthe procedures of targeting on the
federal funds rate and targeting on borrowed reserves
is illustrated by examining the response of the Open
Market Deskin supplying NBR to a shift inthe demand
for reserves. In targeting on borrowed reserves, the
Open Market Desk responds to shifts in the demand
for reserves in a manner similar to its response under
the federal funds rate targeting procedure. The simi-
larity is illustrated by comparing the response of the
supply of NBR to a shift in demand for reserves in
figures 1 and 3. In both figures, the quantity of NBR
supplied is increased in response to an increase in the
demand for- reserves, although the federal funds rate
might be allowed to rise in response to an undesim’ed
rise in the money stock. Figure 2 indicates, in contrast,
that under the NBR targeting procedure the Open
Market Desk keeps NBR unchanged or reduces them
when there is an increase in the demand for reserves
that reflects an increase in the demand for money.
CONCLUSIONS
The Federal Reserve currently implements mone-
tary policy by targeting open market operations on
average levels of reserves borrowed from Federal Re-
serve Banks. This procedureS in effect since October
1982, has somefeatures in common with the prior two
procedures used for implementing monetary policy.
Like the procedure of targeting on nonborrowed re-
serves, in effect from October 1979 until October 1982,
the official range for the federal funds rate is several
hundred basis points wide. Open market operations
are not conducted with the objective of keeping the
federal funds rate at a specific level, as they were un-
“Wallich (1984), p.22.
der the procedure of targeting on the federal funds
rate used for several years prior to October 1979.
The current procedure, however, has other similari-
ties to the procedure of targeting on the federal funds
rate. There is no direct relationship between the ob-
jectives oftheFederal Open Market Committee for the
monetary aggregates and the supply of nonborrowed
reserves, as there was under the procedure of target-
ing on nonborrowed reserves. Under the current pro-
cedure and that oftargeting on the federal funds rate,
the supply ofnonborrowed reserves responds to shifts
in the demand for reserves within a given reserve
maintenance period in such a way that these shifts
have little effect on the federal funds rate. Over longer
periods, however, the federal funds rate might be al-
lowed to move in the same direction as an undesired
change in the money stock under both of those
procedures.
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